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COMMENTS
dicated that in this situation by virtue of comparative negligence
there can be no recovery. 1 29 Another indicated under similar
circumstances that the seaman's recovery should be reduced
fifty per cent.130 Such determinations point to a problem in-
herent in all comparative negligence decisions, i.e., what per-
centage reduction should be assigned to any particular degree
or magnitude of fault.
CONCLUSION
Under the modern doctrine of unseaworthiness seamen are
given a more advantageous action for indemnity for injury than
is afforded passengers and shoreside workers.181 This cause of
action has become firmly entrenched in the law. But like any
other form of judge-made law, it has had to evolve and develop
decision by decision. The resolution of old problems has created
new ones. It is hoped that this Comment will focus attention on
some of these problems and furnish an analytical process for
reaching logical and consistent solutions.
Walter I. Lanier, Jr.
Inter-Sovereign Certification as an Answer to the
Abstention Problem
Under the rule of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,' when jurisdic-
tion is predicated upon diversity of citizenship, federal courts
are required to apply state law. In general, the necessary de-
termination of applicable state law will be made by the federal
court itself, with recourse to such sources as are available. How-
ever, in a significant area of cases, the doctrine of "equitable
abstention" has been applied,2 whereby a federal action will be
129. Donovan v. Esso Shipping Co., 259 F.2d 65 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 907 (1959).
130. Holley v. The Manfred Stansfield, 186 F. Supp. 212 (E.D. Va. 1960).
131. For this reason the Supreme Court has been severely criticized in some
circles. See Boner, One If By Land, Two If By Sea: A Comparative Study of
Remedies Available to Injured Seamen and Land Workers, 30 TEXAS L. REV.
489 (1952) ; The Tangled Seine: A Survey of Maritime Rersonal Injury Remedies,
57 YALE L.J. 243 (1947); Lovitt, Things Are Seldom What They Seem: The
Jolly Little Wards of the Admiralty, 46 A.B.A.J. 171 (1960).
1. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2. The case generally cited as establishing the abstention doctrine is Railroad
Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
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stayed or dismissed8 pending recourse by the parties to state
court in order to secure determination of questions of state law.
Traditionally two sets of policy considerations have supported
employment of abstention - the inadvisability of deciding a fed-
eral constitutional question underpinned by an unresolved ques-
tion of state law, 4 and general considerations of federal-state
comity. When requested, 5 a district court in a case appropriate
for application of the abstention doctrine is required to stay de-
cision of the case pending recourse by the parties to state court,
or to dismiss the federal action. In either instance, the parties to
the controversy then repair to state court, where initial determi-
nations of fact6 and of state law7 necessary to potential federal
adjudication are made. A recent case, Clay v. Sun Insurance Of-
fice Limited,8 has suggested that another approach to the same
problem, another type of abstention, may be for the federal
courts of appeals to certify pertinent questions of state law to
the state supreme courts. This Comment will attempt to discuss
some of the problems raised by this suggestion.
3. There appears to be no great clarity of delineation between the cases where
retention of jurisdiction pending state determination will be employed and those
where the federal action will be dismissed. There is some support for the theory
that dismissal will ordinarily be employed in cases coming into the federal system
on the ground of diversity of citizenship and which involve no federal question,
while retention of jurisdiction and postponement of decision will be used in federal
question cases. The logic of such a distinction would be that in the diversity cases
there is no federal question over which to retain jurisdiction. Upon reflection,
the author has concluded that the distinction attempted in his prior Note, 20
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 614, 616 (1960) is erroneous.
For cases where stay of proceedings and retention have been employed see
Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959) ; Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City
of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959) ; City of Meridian v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co., 358 U.S. 639 (1959) ; Government & Civic Employees Organizing Committee,
CIO v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364 (1957) ; Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352
U.S. 220 (1957).
Dismissal cases include Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951) ; Burford v.
Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
4. The undesirability of deciding constitutional issues underpinned by unre-
solved questions of state law is supported by the fact that the state questions may
prove dispositive, so that constitutional adjudication will be unnecesary, and by
the possibility that later state adjudication may shift the state law upon which
the constitutional determination was based.
5. In at least one case it is indicated that the trial court correctly abstained
on its own motion. See Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360
U.S. 25 (1959).
6. Since the federal court will ordinarily abstain at the outset of the litiga-
tion, before any findings of fact have been made, the state court presumably is
called upon to make its own findings.
7. Apparently it has never been entirely clear whether the state court is also
to decide the federal questions in the case, or only the state law questions. The
Supreme Court's statement in Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 491 (1949), to the
effect that abstaining in that case would raise the problem of "control of the
receiver . . . to keep him from raising in such proceedings federal issues" would
indicate contemplation that the state courts are to decide only state questions.
However, state court compliance with this contemplation is quite another matter.
8..363 U.S. 207 (1960).
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In the Clay case, suit was brought in federal district court in
Florida to recover on an insurance policy issued to plaintiff
while in Illinois. A provision in this policy, probably valid under
Illinois law but clearly not so under the laws of Florida, would
have prohibited recovery. The court gave judgment for the
plaintiff, on the theory that Florida law invalidated the policy
provision in question. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed ;9 the questions of Florida law on which the district court
had predicated its disposition of the case were discussed but
pretermitted, the court simply holding that to apply the Florida
statute to this Illinois contract would do violence to the due proc-
ess clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court,
on certiorari, stated that the court of appeals had erred in reach-
ing the constitutional question, since the state law questions in-
volved in the case may have proven dispositive. The case was
remanded to the court of appeals, with the suggestion that a
Florida statute10 providing for certification of unsettled ques-
tions of state law from the federal courts of appeals to the Flor-
ida Supreme Court be utilized.
Perhaps the first question presented is whether the type of
"inter-sovereign" certification suggested in the Clay case is a
new type of abstention, exercisable by the district courts as well
as by courts of appeals, or rather is a rarer type of procedural
device available only to the appellate courts." Pertinent to this
inquiry is the fact that under the latest developments in the ab-
stention area 12 presumably the usual type of abstention would
9. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 265 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1959).
10. FLA. STAT. § 25.031 (1957). This provision has apparently never been
implemented by rules of court, nor had it received any application prior to the
instant case. See Stern, Conflict of Laws, 12 U. MIAMI L. REv. 383, 395 (1958).
Since the statute reads: "The supreme court of this state may, by rule of court,
provide" for this type of certification, the fact that the court has never done so
gives rise to some question as to the effectiveness of reliance upon the statute.
11. The certification suggested in the Clay case was pursuant to FLA STAT.§ 25.031 (1957), which provides only for such certification from federal courts of
appeals. There may be some question as to whether state statutory authorization
is necessary. As it is difficult to envision the authority under which a state may
make provision for federal disposition of cases, the presence or absence of a state
statute would seem to be significant only from the standpoint of whether or not
in the absence of state accession to such a procedure the federal courts can compel
the state courts to accept certified questions. Probably this question should be
answered in the negative, but it would seem to be an open point at present.
12. Prior to the case of Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux,
360 U.S. 25 (1959), the abstention doctrine was generally considered to obtain
only in equity, where federal injunctive relief against state action or proposed
action was sought. However, the Louisiana Power d Light Co. case was an action
at law involving an expropriation problem, and the district court's employment
of abstention on its own motion was sustained. This departure from the use of
abstention as an equity device was borne heavily upon by Justice Brennan, with
Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas, in dissent.
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have been appropriate on the part of the district court had it
been requested in Clay. If the trial court should have abstained
in the Clay case upon request, perhaps that court should also be
empowered to certify questions to state supreme courts. 13 From
the standpoint of logic, it would seem that the appropriateness
of exercising either type of abstention - the usual abstention, or
inter-sovereign certification - would be determinable at the out-
set of the federal litigation. It is believed that, whether or not
the usual abstention would have been available here, there are
cogent reasons why certification by trial courts would prove un-
desirable. In the first place, it would seem that this sort of
enlistment of state court assistance by the numerous federal dis-
trict courts would not be in accord with the general scheme of
federal-state judicial relations. Clearly the intendment of the
system is that the district courts perform all facets of the task
of litigation in cases properly in the federal system, and function
in diversity cases substantially as another court of the state. If
certification were to be allowed from the federal district courts
to the highest court of the state, it would seem that the increase
in docket load in the state courts might well prove prohibitive.
Probably certification would run only to the state supreme court,
since only that court could furnish a definitive determination of
state law. Another objection to certification by district courts
might be the problem of which tribunal is to find the facts neces-
sary to furnish a background for determination of the certified
question. If, as would be assumed, the necessary questions of
state law were certified at the beginning of the case, before any
findings of fact had been made in the federal court,14 then either
the questions would have to be answered by the state court in
the absence of any factual setting, which would give rise to pos-
sible objections as to the academic or abstract quality of the
answer, or the state court system would be required to make
findings of fact, which would do violence to the theory of certifi-
cation as a speedy and inexpensive method of determining the
answer to isolated questions of law. Neither of the above objec-
tions is presented to the same degree by the usual type of absten-
tion, where the parties repair initially to the lower state courts,
and where the state court makes essential findings of fact.
13. An analogous question is whether, given a case where the trial court should
have but failed to abstain, the court of appeals should remand to the district court
with instructions to abstain, or rather should exercise its own certification power.
14. It would seem unlikely that certification by the district court during the




If inter-sovereign certification is to be exercised only by the
courts of appeals, some of the objections disappear. Ordinarily,
the court of appeals will have at its disposal findings of fact suf-
ficient to constitute a background for the certified question, so
that the problem of either requiring the state court to make find-
ings of fact or eliciting an answer to a naked question of law is
eliminated. Further, the fact that the courts of appeals handle
fewer cases than the district courts lessens the possibility of
overloading the dockets of state high courts. However, other
potential difficulties remain. Perhaps most serious is the chance
that the supreme court of a state will be certified a question of
law which, had the entire case come before that court, it would
have been able to avoid answering. In many instances, flexibil-
ity inherent in techniques of deciding cases and writing opinions
permits disposal of cases without reaching questions which, for
various legitimate reasons of judicial policy, 15 a court would pre-
fer pretermitting. Another potential objection is that often it
may be said that a question may be framed in such a way as to
shade the answer, or perhaps even to pre-determine the answer.
Clearly any reasons in support of certification of questions of
law militate equally strongly against any participation in the
answer to the question by the certifying court.
Although the problem of furnishing an appropriate factual
setting for a certified question is presented with more cogency
if district courts may certify questions, it also exists to an extent
with respect to court of appeals certification. While the appel-
late court will have sufficient factual matter at its disposal with
which to furnish a background for the certified question, de-
cisions as to the proper degree and kind of setting remains. In
some states which provide for certification from trial or inter-
mediate appellate tribunals to the supreme court, part of the rec-
ord in the case is submitted to the reviewing court. In others,
and in the federal system, the reviewing court is furnished with
certain findings of ultimate fact. In both situations, the ques-
tions of the proper degree of factual background - how much
factual matter is to be presented - arises. If a somewhat com-
plete factual setting is furnished, the advantages of certification
as a procedurally inexpensive technique for securing the answer
15. A state supreme court might wish to avoid or defer decision on certain
points of law for such legitimate reasons as the desirability of letting the law
settle or ferment in the lower courts, or to avoid potential influence on pending
legislative or executive action. " i
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to a question of law tend to be submerged. 16 On the other hand,
if too little factual background is submitted to the reviewing
court, the possibility of securing an academic or hypothetical de-
termination is intensified.
The undesirability of securing an academic or abstract an-
swer to a naked question of law is a consideration which has
permeated the field of certification. A fundamental notion of
judicial function is embodied in the "case" or "controversy" re-
quirement contained in the Federal Constitution.' 7 Succinctly
stated, the theory underlying this requirement is that the proper
function of courts is adjudication, not rule-making.' 8 The fact
that judicial determinations acquire a certain stature as prece-
dent results in an unavoidable minimum of judicial infringement
upon a function strictly legislative. Any further infringement is
sought to be alleviated by insistence on the part of the courts
upon an actual justiciable controversy before judicial determina-
tion will be undertaken. The problem of potential violation of
the case or controversy requirement is a particularly intense one
in the field of certification, because ordinarily only a minimum
of factual background will be presented to the court to which
the question is certified, with the resultant possibility that the
court's answer to the question certified may tend to take on an
academic flavor, or may assume the quality of judicial rule-
making, rather than adjudication in the true sense of the term.
A feeling on the part of the federal courts that certification pre-
sents a danger of contravention of their traditional approach to
16. Most jurisdictions providing for certification require that the device not
be employed to secure a determination of the entire case. This requirement as to
federal certification was expressed in Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Williams, 205 U.S.
444, 453-54 (1907), as follows: "The present certificate brings to us a question
of mixed law and fact, and, substantially, all the circumstances connected with
the issue to be determined. It does not present a distinct point of law, clearly
stated, which can be decided without passing upon the weight or effect of all the
evidence out of which the question arises. The question certified is rather a
condensed, argumentative narrative of the facts upon which . . . depends the
validity of the live-stock contract in suit. Thus, practically, the whole case is
brought here by the certified question and we are, in effect, asked to indicate what,
under all the facts stated, should be the final judgment."
17. U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2.
18. In Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937),
the Court stated: "A 'controversy' in this sense must be one that is appropriate
for judicial determination. A justiciable controversy is thus distinguished from a
difference or dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character; from one that is
academic or moot. The controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. It must be a real and
substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive
character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon
a hypothetical state of facts." (Citations omitted.)
[Vol. XXI
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the case or controversy philosophy is evidenced by a palpable re-
luctance to make use of the device.' 9
If the advantages of inter-sovereign certification should be
determined by the federal judiciary to outweigh the disadvan-
tages, further use of the device to implement, or to an extent to
supplant, the usual type of abstention may perhaps be expected.
It is to be hoped that cognizance of some of the possibilities
noted here will be taken before widespread use is undertaken.
David W. Robertson
1958 Amendment to the United States Judicial Code
Relative to the Denial of Costs to a Plaintiff
Since the Judiciary Act of 1789, there has been a jurisdic-
tional amount requirement for suits brought in federal courts
where jurisdiction is predicated on diversity of citizenship be-
tween the parties.' In 1958, in an effort to reduce the number
of cases brought in the federal courts,2 Congress raised the
jurisdictional amount, exclusive of interest and costs, from
$3,000 to $10,000. 3 Included in this statute is a provision allow-
19. Although the United States Supreme Court's jurisdiction over questions
certified from the courts of appeal is theoretically mandatory, the cases where cer-
tificates have been dismissed, as improperly framed or as containing questions
improper for certification, are practically legion. E.g., Busby v. Electrical Utilities
Employees Union, 323 U.S. 72 (1944) ; NLRB v. White Swan Co., 313 U.S. 23
(1941) ; Atlas Life Insurance Co. v. Southern, Inc., 306 U.S. 563 (1939) ; Lowden
v. Northwestern National Bank & Trust Co., 298 U.S. 160 (1936) ; State-Planters
Bank and Trust Co. v. Parker, 283 U.S. 332 (1931). The Lowden case contains
an illuminating exposition by Justice Cardozo of the Supreme Court's policy as
to certified questions of law, including discussion of the case or controversy re-
quirement. See also Moore & Vestal, Present and Potential Role of Certification
in Federal Appellate Procedure, 35 VA. L. REv. 1 (1949).
1. The Act of September 24, 1789, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78, provided that the
value of the matter in controversy must exceed $500. This was raised to $2,000
in 1887, to $3,000 in 1911, and to $10,000 in 1958. See 1 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE 817, 0.90 (2d ed. 1960).
2. See H.R. Rep. No. 1706, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1958), in which it is
stated: "In adopting this legislation the committee feels that it will bring the
minimum amount in controversy up to a reasonable level by contemporary stand-
ards and that it will ease the workload of our Federal courts by reducing the
number of cases involving corporations which come into Federal district courts
on the fictional premises that a diversity of citizenship exists."
3. 72 Stat. 415 (1958), amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (1952). In addi-
tion to the provision increasing the jurisditcional amount and providing that
costs may be denied the plaintiff in certain instances, the statute also provides
that a corporation shall be deemed a citizen of the state where it has its principal
place of business and that civil actions in any state court arising under the
workmen's compensation laws of that state may not be removed to federal district
